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Abstract 
Principles are part of international law as much as of other legal orders. Nonetheless, beyond 
principles referred to the functioning of IL, or the sector related discipline in discrete fields, those 
fundamental principles identifying the raison d’etre, purpose and value of the legal international order, 
as a whole, remain much disputed, to say the least. In addressing such a problem, one that deeply 
affects interpretation and legal adjudication, this article acknowledges the limits and weakness of legal 
positivism in making sense of the inter- and supra-national legal order(s). It appraises also the novel 
from the late Ronald Dworkin, concerning IL, and its consequence for interpretivism in the 
international environment, so different from State political communities and their ‘integrity’. Finally, 
some recent cases before international Courts shall be considered, that expose difficulties stemming 
from traditional legal positivist strictures, and explain how judicial reasoning actually profits from 
asking further questions of principles. All the more so, if the issues at stake happen to be covered by 
two or more diverging legal regimes, that would, per sé, lead to opposite outcomes. 
Keywords 
International law, principles, legal regimes, legal adjudication, interpretivism, justice. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite their disputed nature, principles play a cardinal role in International Law (IL) and in Courts 
not only by filling legal gaps, but also as fundamental means for the interpretation of rules and the 
enhancement of legal reasoning
1
.  
A canonical way to see principles in IL places them among the sources of law, as stated by art. 38 
(1c) of ICJ Statute. It is to be noted, however, that they can surface within more than one source. In the 
context of the ICJ, from art. 38 paragraph 1(a), or (b), ie in the application of conventional or 
customary law by which they might be generated, beyond the separate provision singling out those 
principles ‘recognized among civilized nations’, in paragraph 1 (c).2 Famously, to the latter Hersch 
Lauterpacht
3
- Judge in the ICJ- referred as subsidiary general principles with the special, systemic, 
function of banning non liquet from the realm of (international) law.  
Taking account of that background, the issue can be raised whether some set of principles, 
distinctively underpinning the international legal order, is capable of shaping its identity: as much as in 
any (State) legal systems, in their constitutional and primary law, principles frame the fundamental- 
ethical and political- choices to be pursued. They would function as gap-filling as well as interpretive 
resources supporting IL as a whole.  
Accordingly, they should belong in the fundamental raison d’etre of IL properly. Besides 
principles of law-functioning, referring to how IL can work, like pacta sunt servanda or, say, good 
faith, they would be closer to the question as to why it is valued and what are being its substantive 
purposes.  
In truth, such a question is not different from the one most recently tackled by the late Ronald 
Dworkin, in a posthumous article
4
, suggesting legal principles that, in his view, would frame IL, and 
help resolving ‘disagreements’ in identifying positive IL norms, to be applied in adjudicative issues.  
This chapter shall also consider whether an ‘interpretive’ theory of law (renowned as one 
addressing the alleged weakness of strict legal positivism) can better suit the increasing appearance of 
principles and the current evolutionary trends of IL. To this regard, judicial cases, namely those 
originating from being a single issue under the reach of concurring, and often conflicting, legalities, 
shall be eventually examined. Among their many functions in IL, principles can help reconciling 
divergences stemming from the multiplicity of separate ‘regimes’ (presently featuring in IL) that 
hardly would be solved by ‘formal’ legal tools (lex specialis, lex posterior, etc.)5. 
                                                     
1
 F. Raimondo, General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, Brill, Leiden, 
2008.  
2
 Ibidem, p. 42.  
3
 H. Lauterpacht, “Some Observations on the Prohibition of Non Liquet and the Completeness of the Legal Order”, in 
Symbolae Verzijl (1958), and published as ch. 9 in Id., International Law. Collected Papers, Cambridge, CUP, 1975. 
4
 R. Dworkin, “A New Philosophy of International Law”, in Philosophy & Public Affairs, 41, no. 1, 1 ff.  
5
 M. Koskenniemi, Introduction, “Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of IL”, ILC, 58 sess, 2006 (A/61/10, para. 
251).[http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2006/2006report.htm].  
 On the proliferation of regimes and courts, for ex. Y. Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and 
Tribunals, Oxford, OUP 2003. 
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2. What (and whose) Principles?  
2.1. “General principles of law recognised by civilised nations” (art 38 1 c) are held to play the 
function of those clauses that in domestic systems refer to natural law (as in the Austrian civil code, 
art. 7) or the general principles of the legal order of the State (Italian civil code, disposizioni 
preliminari, art. 12). As a consequence, reference to them is mainly meant to face the issue of legal 
lacunae. It embraces the doctrine of a legal system’s completeness, one that in turn justifies, as 
mentioned above, (the feasibility of) the prohibition of non liquet
6
 : “'the principle affirming the 
completeness of the legal order” is to be seen as “the positive formulation of the prohibition of non 
liquet'.
7
 And both should be seen as positive rules in customary law
8
. 
In truth, reference to principles belonging to civilised legal systems has been understood as evoking 
jus gentium, and it is contended upon, between at least two main theoretical strands. One assumes that 
these principles pertain to no particular system, being instead fundamental to all systems, and showing 
the essential unity of law, apparently as a matter of reason
9
. The other derives its rationale from 
comparative legal approaches: enquiry throughout various national systems shows that the widest 
consensus supports some legal principles that accordingly become general international law, 
“independently of custom or treaties”10. 
The resort of general principles, if seen through legal realist lenses, equates with an opening in 
favour of judicial discretion, if not judicial norm-creation. From some legal realist standpoint, general 
principles have been feared as the Trojan Horse of natural law and morality into the interstices of 
positive norms
11
. For Julius Stone (commenting on Lauterpacht) “even if, for the sake of argument, we 
were to accept the 'natural law' version most favorable to Judge Lauterpacht's position, namely, that 
these principles represent a kind of inexhaustible storehouse of potential law, they still would not 
dispense the judge from making law-creative choices”12. Stone stressed the point, later become largely 
undisputed among legal scholars, that principles might be conflicting themselves, “and, indeed, often 
to the same principle by reason of its ambiguity, circuity or indeterminacy” can be traced diverse 
outcomes.
13
 Stone’s early criticism notwithstanding, legal systems are undoubtedly held to include 
principles, whose standards, far from being a sheer appeal to vague morality or natural law, are 
positive law essential in the construction of present legal orders.  
                                                     
6
 For J. Stone, “Non liquet comes into argument rather when applicable rules of appropriate content and precision are 
simply not available for adjusting the particular clash of interests.” (J. Stone, “Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the 
International Community”, 35 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 124, 1959, at p. 124). 
7
 H. Lauterpacht, ‘Some Observations on the Prohibition of Non Liquet and the Completeness of the Legal Order', in 
Symbolae Verzijl (1958), and published as ch. 9 in Id., International Law. Collected Papers, supra fn. 3, p. 216. 
8
 Ibidem p. 196. 
9
 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1987), Cambridge, CUP 
(Reprint) 2006, p. 24.  
10
 W. R. Hearn, ‘The International Legal Regime Regulating Nuclear Deterrence Warfare’, 61 Brit Y.B. Int’L L. 199, 
(1990), p. 225. 
11
 In different words, the door opening to (rule’s) validity criteria placed outside the legal system. The duty to decide holds 
despite absent or conflicting rules; its feasibility is granted by recourse to principles, whose membership in the legal 
system -if any- would hardly prevent any reference to law of nature or of reason.  
12
 Stone, cit. supra fn 6, at p. 133 
13
 As a consequence, a ”law-creating choice” shall be in place, although it shall be disguised by way of “logical deduction 
from the principle finally chosen” (Ibidem). 
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As I see them, and as legal theory and jurisprudence have abundantly afforded consistent evidence 
in that regard, principles as normative standards, regardless of their treatment in different legal 
theories, hold a central place as positive law. Likewise, even those most structural ‘general principles 
of law’, play a fundamental function in every legal order: this is why art. 38 of the ICJ Statute upholds 
them as recognized among civilized nations, given their belonging to law functioning, as Lauterpacht 
would have them. Bin Cheng’s analysis has recorded the general principles of law through their use by 
International Courts and Tribunals and listed several such as self-preservation, good faith (and notably 
pacta sunt servanda, as well as malicious exercise of a right), varieties of sections on the principle of 
responsibility (fault, causality, individual responsibility, integral reparation, among them), most 
principles in judicial proceedings (from those inherent in jurisdiction to the various jura novit curia, 
audiatur et altera pars, nemo judex in causa propria, res judicata, etc.)
14
. 
2.2. Also due to the special features of the international legal system, the capacity and latitude of 
fixed rules stricto sensu, in a positivist view, appears at times limited: be it a matter of completeness 
of the system or otherwise, there are cases where international norms have led to no answer or 
otherwise stated, unsatisfactory outcomes. As Jan Klabbers has recalled, “[M]any have held that the 
bombing of Belgrade in 1999 was illegal, yet legitimate; the non-activity of the United Nations in 
Rwanda or Srebrenica, in the mid-1990s, was legally difficult to condemn, yet morally wrong”.15  
It is because of these and similar issues, that Klabbers is focusing on some ‘virtue ethics’ that 
should be inherently essential for at least those that are entrusted to make the most of international law 
norms, and international judges among them.
16
 And not by chance, among the general principles of 
international law, good faith is in pride of place in measuring how should the key norm -pacta sunt 
servanda -be observed
17
.  
However, aside from the prospect of a possible virtue ethics in IL, as a matter of fact those 
problems that stem from missing or conflicting norms – or that as such are perceived- seem to be 
increasingly apparent in International law context, all the more so due to the more demanding 
objectives of the ‘civilised nations’ in the last 60 years. Thus, the full range of available IL principles 
is hardly overestimated and should better be felt as part of an ongoing constructive endeavor: it 
embraces certainly general principles of the law of civilized nations, principles of law-functioning, but 
also the principles belonging to specialized international rule-making (in, say, trade law, human rights 
law, environmental law, humanitarian law and the like)
18
. Nonetheless, it is worth supposing that 
                                                     
14
 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1987), Cambridge, CUP 
(Reprint) 2006. 
15
 Jan Klabbers, ‘Towards a culture of formalism? Martti Koskenniemi and the Virtues’, Temple International & 
Comparative Law Journal , autumn 2013, p. 430. See Bruno Simma, ‘NATO, the UN, and Use of Force: Legal Aspects’, 
10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999). And Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, 
London, Penguin, 2000, pp. 68–72.  
16
 Some requisites of personal integrity, impartiality, honesty and the like are held for U.N officials, and codes of conduct 
for those with special mandates as Rapporteurs. Cf. Klabbers, supra fn 15, pp. 433 ff and Human Rights Council Res. 5/2, 
Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-holders of the Human Rights Council, 9th Sess., art. 3(e) (June 18, 
2007).  
17
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26 ( May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331) (“Every treaty in force is binding 
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”).  
18
 Those principles range from higher-lower levels of generality: think of the principle of non discrimination in its specific 
WTO appearance as the “most favoured nation” principle, and its underlying rationale of enhancing unrestricted free 
trade. For example, it is maintained that “In the current WTO, the traditional trade law principles of most favoured nation 
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adjudicative matters would better be viewed could one be drawing on principles bearing some 
substantive raison d’etre of IL as a specific legal order.  
To such principles might lead, for example, the idea, suggested by Anne Peters, of a ‘compensatory 
constitutionalism’, one encapsulating a general rationale of current IL. It conceives IL under a specific 
understanding which, through evidence of what she defines micro- and macro constitutionalisation 
trends, enhances fundamental norms that would help manage transnational level issues. Conflict-
solution requires a balancing of interests in the concrete case, in the absence of abstract hierarchy. 
According to Peters, the international lawyer should determine “the supremacy of international law 
over domestic constitutional law in a non-formalist way”, that is, assessing the rank of the norms at 
stake “according to their substantial weight and significance”19. However, fundamental norms would 
require some legitimacy, in the absence of a true international constitution, while state sovereignty and 
consent are no longer accepted as the sole source of legitimacy of international law
20
. 
As I see it, the interplay between different regimes of law and separate orders in the global 
intercourses should be guided through mutually pondering their respective fundamental principles; as 
they function like hermeneutic sources of interpretation, it is relevant how international law’s rationale 
and legitimacy are justified and through what substantive principles.  
2.3. Such a question is of a type familiar to State legal orders and to constitutional reasoning in the 
last decades. It is plain fact that substantive principles, often enshrined in our constitutions, define 
scope, values, and purpose of a legal order as a whole, by channelling rules’ interpretation on one side 
and, on the other, connecting its general coherence both to the logical consistency of its norms and to 
the evolving political- ethical pillars of its own community of people.  
Although such a role of principles has become uncontested, it was famously made part of a self-
standing theory of law, neither positivist nor naturalist, but interpretivist, by Ronald Dworkin: a theory 
that is centred explicitly upon the adjudicative side
21
. Each legal order is to be referred to its own 
community, and principles belong to or constitute a bridge toward the integrity of its political 
morality. In truth, an interpretivist theory of law could accordingly be extended to IL, as much as to 
any legal orders properly meant, provided that a general rationale characterising the essential 
principles in the political morality of an international system of law is found.  
(Contd.)                                                                  
and national treatment operate against state failure in the form of protectionism. These principles are constitutive of the 
system of multilayered governance and thus may be considered as amounting to constitutional principles of the trading 
system. They constrain the WTO members and are increasingly viewed as two facets of a constitutional principle of non-
discrimination ultimately benefiting the ordinary citizens (such as importers, exporters, producers, consumers and 
taxpayers)” (K. Armingeon, K. Milewicz, S. Peter and A. Peters, “The constitutionalisation of international trade law”, in 
The Prospects of International Trade Regulation: From Fragmentation to Coherence, Thomas Cottier and Panagiotis 
Delimatsis, eds., Cambridge, CUP, 2011, pp. 69-102, at p. 76. 
19
 A. Peters, “Conclusions”, in J. Klabbers. A. Peters, G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law, OUP 
2009, p. 348. 
20
 A. Peters, “Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and 
Structures,  Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, pp. 579–610, 2006.  
21
 Among his many works especially , R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, and London, 
Fontana Press, 1986. 
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However, in the tradition of legal positivism, from Austin to Hart, the very foundations and the 
maturity of IL as a legal order were never fully recognised
22
; on the other hand, substantive principles, 
of an ultimate nature, sustaining IL are not easily (nor unanimously) presupposed, despite the number 
of supranational preambles, charters, conventions and quasi-universal convergence upon peace, 
security, human rights (let alone jus cogens and banning of war, torture, genocide, slavery). It is 
contentious if historical progress of international law has overcome the traditional core of a law 
treating bilateral interests under the dogma of states’ free will; if a super partes law23, to be oriented 
by the interests of humanity has changed its nature
24
; if individuals have superseded States as the 
ultimate subjects for whose sake sovereignty itself appears now a conditional notion
25
, and so forth.  
If we imagined to adopt an interpretivist approach, by Dworkin’s lessons drawn on western 
constitutional States, it would be arduous to argue through the key notion of integrity
26
, extended to 
IL. That concept connects coherence of a legal order with the political morality of a well-defined 
social polity, while inter-states arena would still lack the unity of something like a universal 
community. 
Nonetheless, in the article of his last days
27
, eventually Dworkin tried to offer the missing template 
for IL, and made use of his ‘interpretivist’ theory of law in the domain of extra-State law, by providing 
some newly forged support, one that does not imply either some macro-polity, of a cosmopolitan 
nature, or an extended , universal and substantive ‘integrity’.  
He did so, by spelling what he believed the fundamental principles that specifically attain to IL, 
those that should justify the existence of the international legal order. Of course, even if found 
controversial, still they can set the scene for a long awaited focus upon the distinctive underpinning of 
IL, thereby making interpretive endeavour to begin as a principle-based exercise.  
  
                                                     
22
 J. Waldron, "International Law: 'A Relatively Small and Unimportant' Part of Jurisprudence?" (2013), New York 
University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers. Paper 427,  http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/427J, pp. 209-
223.  
23
 A. Cassese, International Law, 2d ed., Oxford, OUP, 2005, p. 217. 
24
 R. Teitel, Humanity’s Law , Oxford, OUP, 2011; A. Cassese, The Human Dimension of international law. Selected paper 
of A. Cassese, Oxford, OUP, 2008.  
25
 A.M. Slaughter, ‘Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform’,The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 99, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 619-631. 
26
 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra fn 21, pp. 176-275. 
27
 R. Dworkin, “A New Philosophy of International Law”, in Philosophy & Public Affairs, 41, no. 1, 1 ff. 
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3. Dworkin’s ‘principled’ theory of International Law  
3.1. Dworkin rejects the positivist and Hartian idea
28
 according to which rules are valid only 
depending on the criteria of recognition spelled by a fundamental secondary rule of the legal system. 
He refutes on one side the conclusiveness of such a theory as policing system’s borders, on the other 
side, the social convention that is held to pinpoint specifically the birth and life of IL, that is, States’ 
consent.  
The latter remains unpersuasive: it does not establish any priority among sources, gives no clue on 
whose consent is ultimately relevant, or when customary rules become peremptory; and what have 
states consented to remains often disputed (in many cases text cannot be decisive: e.g. art 2 (4) UN 
charter on prohibition of the use of force). Even more fundamentally, for States to accept something as 
law, “they need some other standard to decide what they should regard as law”29. That more basic 
principle, not the fact of consent, provides “the grounds of international law”: similarly, the obligating 
strength of promises, cannot be due to the mere fact of promising
30
.  
Thus, being consent irredeemably flawed (and Dworkin is not alone in making that point)
31
, the 
‘sociological’ and descriptive answer according to which IL is law because it is believed law by 
“almost everyone”32 cannot be final33.  
Briefly to resume, Dworkin states that it is in order to improve the legitimacy of their coercive 
strength vis à vis their citizens, that States have a duty to accept a mitigation of their own power and to 
“accept feasible and shared constraints” based on IL34. It is today adequate for the State to achieve its 
legitimacy only if its coercive power is “consistent with the dignity of citizens”, that is, a matter of 
substance not of pedigree; and similarly, even the international order makes up for the coercive 
system that States impose to their citizen: for the State, “ [I]t follows that the general obligation to try 
to improve its political legitimacy includes an obligation to try to improve the overall international 
                                                     
28
 H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law (with a Postscript edited by P.A. Bulloch and J. Raz)(2nd ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997), 
chapter X. 
29
 R. Dworkin, “A New Philosophy of International Law”, supra fn 27, at p. 9. 
30
 Ibidem, p. 10 and with reference to ch. 14 of R. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 2011. 
31
 For example, see Martti Koskenniemi on the vicious circle between facts and norms ie between States’ consent and its 
being norm-generative (normative) upon States themselves: M. Koskenniemi, “The Politics of International Law”, in 
European Journal of International Law, 1, 1, (1990), pp. 4-32.. And upon the problematic reflexivity of pacta sunt 
servanda, G. Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law’, in FM van Asbeck et al. 
(eds.), Symbolae Verzijl (Martinus Nijhoff 1958), pp. 153-176.  
32
 Dworkin, “A New Philosophy of International Law”, supra, n.27, p. 3 
33
 This argument is not only typical to Dworkin’s criticism of legal positivism. It is an objection that can be raised against 
any conventionalist approach. As Cotterrell noted, accepting as law simply what “people identify and treat through their 
social practices as ‘law’ “, keeps a “definitional concern with what the concept of law should cover, yet removing from 
the concept as defined all analytical power” (R. Cotterrell, “Transnational Communities and the Concept of Law”, in 
Ratio Juris, 21, 1 (March 2008) (1–18), at p. 8. The reference is to B. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and 
Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 166.  
34
 Dworkin, “A New Philosophy of International Law”, supra, fn.27, p. 17.  
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system” 35 (that means, so improving its own government legitimacy), and such an obligation includes 
cooperative duties, beyond a law of co-existence
36
. 
The latter shall be all the more relevant in the future, if we think of those challenges to States self 
referentiality stemming from climate change or other environmental interests common to all peoples.  
However, of itself, such a principle of mitigation is insufficiently determinative as to different 
possible regimes of IL; accordingly Dworkin coins the principle of salience. It is a normative principle 
itself, and works in connection with the first. It establishes the duty prima facie to abide by codes and 
practices already agreed upon by a consistent number of States and populations. A duty that shall have 
an obvious “snowballing effect”.37 The moral obligation of all nations – for ex. to treat UN law as law- 
flows from the combined sense of those two principles, and explains as well why even States’ 
constitutions tend to include and protect more widespread rules considered as jus gentium or even 
peremptory, jus cogens.  
3.2. Dworkin does not embrace any cosmopolitan view. International law principles are traced back 
to the rationale of the relationship between State power and its citizens, not to a global hypothetical 
government or to universal justice. It is a second level order of States, and international organisations, 
to matter, not a universal community of individuals. As far as I can see, even the ‘political morality’ of 
the international system can only enjoy a second level status, that is, the integrity of its values has a 
derivative status not a self-standing substantive content. And in fact mitigation applies to the system of 
sovereigns. Therefore, even one of the fundamental canons of Dworkin’s general philosophy, equal 
concern and respect
38
 for each individuals, does not feature within the scope of IL immediately. 
Mitigation and salience refer to States’ system (or to powerful international organisations) premised on 
the general duty of States to protect the dignity of individuals. Because States shall have to respect 
citizens’ rights, their sovereignty shall not prevent other States’ intervention to stop genocide; 
mitigation shall ask States not to refuse cooperation in facing communal interest of humanity, be it 
concerning security, hunger, environmental protection. Mitigation is explained, in a nutshell, as a 
source of both negative and positive duties. Although Dworkin suggests, as “phantasy upon phantasy”, 
an international court having jurisdiction “over all the nations of the world”, such a thought-
experiment comes with a clear statement about the domain of International Law: a very distinct part of 
what “morality and decency require of States and other international bodies in their treatment of one 
another”39. And again along these lines he asks which argument a hypothetical court should use to 
determine “the rights and obligations of States (and other international actors and organizations) that it 
                                                     
35
 Ibidem 
36
 Ibidem: “Any state … improves its legitimacy when it promotes an effective international order that would prevent its 
own possible future degradation into tyranny” (p. 17); it does the same also when it can protect its people, on whom it has 
monopoly of force, from invasions of other peoples; moreover, a state fails in a further way if it discourages cooperation 
to prevent economic, commercial, medical or environmental disaster (Ibidem, p. 18). As to cooperation in IL see for ex. 
Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law , New York, Columbia University Press 1964.  
37
 Dworkin, “A New Philosophy of International Law”, supra fn 27, p.19. As Dworkin writes: “If some humane set of 
principles limiting the justified occasions of war and means of waging war gains wide acceptance, for instance, then the 
officials of other pertinent nations have a duty to embrace and follow that set of principles” (Ibidem).  
38
 “Equal concern and respect” had a pivotal role in Dworkin’s philosophy since his Taking Rights Seriously (with a new 
appendix, a response to critics), Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1978, Introduction, p. XII: “This most 
fundamental of rights is a distinct conception of the right to equality, that I call the right to equal concern and respect”. 
39
 Dworkin, “A New Philosophy of International Law”, supra fn 27, p. 13. 
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would be appropriate for it to enforce coercively?”40. So the question is defined by the borders of the 
Westphalian system of States and within them. States are the theoretical bridge between social 
communities of individuals and international law.  
All in all, the “new philosophy” can be seen as an upgrade in theory, intended to explain the state 
of the art in IL and to validate a legal order through its own systemic principles, replacing the 
presumption of consent. But once this reconstruction of IL has been done, IL becomes suited to 
Dworkinian theory of law as interpretive (as opposed to positivist theories of law, or natural law). 
4. The features of an interpretive (adjudicative) theory of law 
The features of interpretivism were spelled by Dworking in the last decades, and not with reference to 
IL. What Dworkin can contribute here, mirrors the logic of his criticism to Hartian theory in the ‘70s: 
roughly, the positivist view leaves too much to lawyers’ discretion. Note that even with IL, Dworkin 
now warns that the recurrent appeal to morality as a direct reason for action, outside what law is held 
to prescribe (as Franck did in the case of NATO intervention in Kosovo)
41
 would be a fatal 
undermining of the still fragile IL. What Dworkin is thinking about is the relocation of those choices- 
deemed to be morally, although not legally, mandatory- as disagreements within the legal domain. 
And this can be done, as we already know, by interpreting “the documents and practices picked out by 
the principle of salience so as to advance the imputed purpose of mitigating the flaws and dangers of 
the Westphalian system”.42  
However, as to the nature of law being interpretive, there is no novelty distinctive to IL. Law is 
interpretive because it postulates a practice where participants can disagree about what the practice 
(like International law) really requires, and assign a value and a purpose
43
 to it, achieve insights about 
conditions of truth of particular propositions of law under those purposes and within the constraints of 
historical records, documents and relevant materials, sources shaping the object of that practice
44
.  
It is of importance that nowhere Dworkin denies that such structures, rules, and institutions are 
central to the existence or identification of a legal system. 
45
 However, being law interpretive, a 
descriptive/sociological view would not be definitive or sufficiently determinative as regards the 
doctrinal questions concerning what is the law in particular cases. Questions about the truth of 
propositions of law- or about whether and how a norm (or even a judicial outcome) is ‘valid’- are 
normally traced back to the grounds of law
46
, that is, to the existing institutional premises (judicial 
                                                     
40
 Ibidem, p. 15. 
41
 Ibidem p. 23, Dworkin mentions Thomas M. Franck, “Lessons of Kosovo,” American Journal of International Law 93 
(1999), pp. 857–60. 
42
 Dworkin, “A New Philosophy of International Law”, supra fn 27, p. 22. 
43
 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra fn. 21, p. 52. 
44
 R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes, Cambridge Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 2006, p. 140. 
45
 “…Hart was right to think that the combination of first-order standards imposing duties and second-order standards 
regulating the creation and identification of those first-order rules is a central feature of paradigmatic legal systems. His 
emphasis on this structure was not itself remarkably original. […] Hart’s distinctive contribution was his claim that in 
paradigmatic legal systems the most fundamental secondary rule or set of rules — the complex standard for identifying 
which other secondary and primary rules count as law — has that force only through convention”. R. Dworkin, “Hart and 
the Concepts of Law”, in Harvard Law Review Forum, 119, (2006) 95, at p. 100. 
46
 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra n. 21, p. 4. 
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precedents, legislatures, procedural requirements, and the like) that ‘positivism’ identifies by 
consensus. Such questions are allegedly solved, according to hartian legal positivism, by verifying 
whether the required historical facts have been met (the proper procedural enactment, the ‘right’ 
source etc.). Although criteria of identification are provided in the rule of recognition of a legal order, 
disagreement would nonetheless possibly persist. True disagreements are hardly revolving around 
what the actual grounds of law are, their empirical (historical) existence and pedigree. Genuine 
disagreements, with Dworkin (who calls them ‘theoretical’) reach the identity (value and purpose) of 
the grounds of law, beyond their existence. Under contestation is not ‘what really happened’, but what 
legal scope and import it should bear (not whether the Parliament has actually legislated, but what 
consequence should be ascribed to that). Being not empirical, they involve evaluations of principle. 
Indeed, they depend on the ascription of different meaning and purpose to those grounds of law once 
factually identified. Accordingly, invoking some different principles of political morality (involving 
the identity, scope, and value of the institutional system as a whole) determines different 
interpretations of the same grounds of law and corresponding answers to the problem of what the law 
is, ie the truth of legal propositions
47
. 
Of course, from such a perspective, the positivist assumption of consensus on the (interpretation of) 
grounds of law is untenable. Scott Shapiro has nicely summarized the positivist puzzle to this regard: 
“… it is common ground between exclusive and inclusive legal positivists that the grounds of law are 
determined by convention. How can they account for disagreements about the legal bindingness of 
certain facts whose bindingness, by hypothesis, requires the existence of agreement on their 
bindingness?”48.  
Accordingly, if we do not wish to disregard the domain of IL, as a legal one, we cannot ignore the 
interpretive reading
49
.  
5. Multiple legalities, principles and exemplary case law. 
5.1. After Dworkin’s explicit contribution to IL, one further aspect, however, is to be mentioned, one 
that, as I shall submit, belongs to the potentialities of interpretivism within IL, although it is not either 
identified or elaborated upon by Dworkin himself. Because of IL being re-directed towards principles, 
they can also get to a function that legal positivism is hardly equipped to sustain or even admit. As I 
maintain, principles can be resorted to in order to explain and possibly solve disagreements on the 
                                                     
47
 It goes without saying here that Dworkin can hardly be isolated or sidelined to this regard, since as he knows, the post 
Hartian decades have shown the salience of this second view, in diverse ways upheld by positivist writings, from 
Coleman to Waldron, MacCormick, Postema and Schauer (as Dworkin himself writes in his ‘Hart and the Concepts of 
Law’, 119 Harvard Law Review Forum, 95 (2006), at p. 104). And it is rather revealing even the “nuanced difference” as 
to the precise role of morality vis à vis law, that Waldron has recently noticed between the late Dworkin in Justice for 
Hedgehogs and the exclusive positivism of Joseph Raz (in his Incorporation by Law : J Raz, ‘Incorporation by Law”, in 
Legal Theory 1, (2004), 1: esp. p. 6). Cf. J. Waldron, ‘Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs’, Public Law and Legal theory 
Research Paper Series Working Paper, n. 13-45,’ NYU, pp.1-32, see pp. 16 ff. 
48
 S. Shapiro, The Hart – Dworkin debate: A short guide for the perplexed, WP n. 77, March 2007, Michigan University, 
Public Law and Legal theory WP Series, p. 38. 
49
 Ironically one can say that the autonomy of the theory vis à vis empirical facts is here to be invoked not in order for them 
to be disregarded (recall Hegel at the news of a new planet’s discovery: “Desto schlimmer für die Tatsachen”), but for 
them to be taken into account. It seems that Hegel said so when informed that a 7th planet had been discovered (by 
Herschel in 1781), after having based his dissertation, De Orbitis Planetarum, on the assumption that there could be no 
more than 6.  
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valid rule to be applied, not only in those circumstances of routine, current in State legal orders (like 
gap-filling, rules interpretation, contrast among relevant principles, for example) but even, and all the 
more so, when divergences concern meaning, import, and scope of norms that, though controlling one 
single case at stake, might belong in separate legalities: the latter confront each other and each would 
lead to different legal outcomes, providing a different point of view as to validity. In other words, 
principles can have a further role in addressing disagreements arising from the segmented texture of 
supranational law and the issues covered, often divergently, by different legal institutional regimes. It 
can be argued that, on one side, disagreements about the valid rule to be applied cannot be overcome 
by reference to the criteria in the rule of recognition controlling the jurisdictional scope of one (among 
the) relevant legal regime(s). On the other side, judicial decision-making has (cf. sections below) 
deployed a principled-based reasoning in order to address problems located at the crossroads between 
different legal sub-systems. This move involves the turn to an interpretative notion of law, one which, 
among the rest, adds to the received dogmas of strict legal positivism, and makes the assessment of 
principles to appear as the actual frontier of law-findings in international law matters. 
That shall be shown by referring to some recent decisions of the ECtHR (Al Jedda and Al Dulimi) 
whose reasoning treats divergence between the UN Security Council, Switzerland (the State involved) 
and the European Convention of Human rights. For convenience we can speak of a kind of second 
level disagreements.  
Proliferation of orders and ‘regimes’ of law50 generates some historical-institutional divergence, 
through self-referentiality, and implies that the practice of a rule of recognition cannot easily develop 
in place of the multiplicity of relative rules of recognition. In the apparent inconclusiveness of “social 
sources based” law, divergence originates not within one single, self-contained regime, but flows from 
the institutional, ‘legally objective’ otherness of one (sub)‘legality’ vis à vis the other. Making sense of 
such a complex and heterogeneous setting is a constructive endeavour, ultimately prompted by the 
adjudicative questions: they generate, however, the need of relocating opposite claims within a kind 
contextual whole, as mutually normative disagreements. 
5.2. After fragmented-law exemplary cases, like Mox Plant and others
51
, attention is to be brought 
to significant judicial decisions following some UN Security Council resolutions. Judicial cases have 
                                                     
50
 Fears are raised that further law would only express unilateral need of the most powerful to create their own institutions, 
or provide leeway through multiplication of routes of non-compliance, allow for sidestepping preexisting commitments, 
trigger the ‘court choice’ as a forum shopping, and so forth. For ex. Against constitutionalization process as an even 
process (or one that would freeze the existing power relations, regardless of their actual legitimacy-as it would be the 
case of WTO multilateral trading order’s absence of democratic contestability and inclusiveness), see N. Krisch , 
‘International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order ’, ( 2005 ) 
16 European Journal of International Law, 377 ; R. Howse and K. Nicolaidis , ‘Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: 
Constitutionalism of Global Subsidiarity? ’ (2003) 16 Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, 
and Institutions 73. And for the geopolitical related analysis, K Armingeon, K Milewicz, ‘Compensatory 
Constitutionalism: A Comparative Perspective ’, ( 2008 ) 22 Global Society , pp. 179 –96.  
51
 I recall Martti Koskenniemi, on this case- among the most debated upon some years ago- to which three different regimes 
were applicable: “Let me quote the Tribunal [Arbitral Tribunal at the UNCLOS]: ‘even if the OSPAR Convention, the 
EC Treaty and the Euratom treaty contain rights or obligations similar to or identical with the rights set out in [the 
UNCLOS], the rights and obligations under these agreements have a separate existence from those under [the 
UNCLOS]’. The tribunal then held that the application of even the same rules by different institutions might be different 
owing to the ‘differences in the respective context, object and purposed, subsequent practice of parties and travaux 
preparatoires’. It is not only that the boxes have different rules. Even if they had the same rules, they would be applied 
differently because each box has a different objective and a different ethos, a different structural bias” (Koskenniemi, 
International Law: between Fragmentation and Constitutionalism, 2006: pp. 4-5 available at 
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displayed different attitudes in a progress that goes from a self-referential, or one-sided, to a whole-
related, or comprehensive legal reasoning: that is, an argument that works through bridging or 
integrating, for the case at hand, the normative propositions belonging to different orders involved, 
that would claim for divergent outcomes. 
After the milestone case, Kadi
52
, at the ECJ, others followed at the ECtHR. In Kadi the Court made 
an argument for European primary law to prevail over the obligations stemming from IL (art. 103 UN) 
to implement a resolution of the UNSC. The decision was widely welcome for its defence of 
fundamental rights, and also criticised because of withholding the EU from IL obligations (contrary to 
the advice of the Tribunal of First Instance in its own Kadi decision)
 53
, thus betraying true 
internationalism (like the US, in Medellin
54
 and elsewhere): a kind of American style exceptionalism,
55
 
contradicting the original attitudes of compliance of the EC in the ‘50s56. Actually, and beyond its 
many virtues (that such a criticism seems indeed to sideline), the ECJ (today CJEU) reasoning 
amounted to a pronouncement shielded by self-reference to the rule of law in its own jurisdiction: 
accordingly, not an assessment about the infringement of fundamental rights in a supranational sphere 
where the two jurisdictions involved are interrelated
57
. It settled not a question of disagreement, but a 
question of primacy. The two things are not compatible.  
Rather different approach was displayed by the ECtHR in Al Jedda (2011) and in Al Dulimi 
(2012). The ECtHR decides to exceed the latitude of its own jurisdiction as defined by the rules of 
recognition of the Convention and resorts to wider principles reflecting the United Nation system and 
–as Dworkin would have it- the deeper political morality of international law as a whole.  
The Grand Chamber found in Al-Jedda v United Kingdom
58
, that indefinite detention without 
charge of Al Jedda (dual citizen British/Iraqui) by the UK in a Basra facility controlled by British 
forces was unlawful and infringed his rights to liberty under art. 5 of the ECHR. The ECtHR rejected 
the opinion upheld by the House of Lords in the UK (before Al Jedda’s appeal to the ECtHR) that the 
indefinite detention of Al Jedda flowed from compliance with the UNSC resolution (n.1546), as 
(Contd.)                                                                  
http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MCanberra-06c.pdf .However in the same line there had been 
equally famous cases like Swordfish: at WTO: Chile- WTO Doc. WT/DS193; at the ITLOS, Chile v. Eur. Com.(Mar. 15, 
2001)(available www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/Order1_2001Eng_pdf ) (suspended). M. Orellana, “The Swordfish Dispute 
between the EU and Chile at the ITLOS and the WTO”, NORDIC Journal of International Law, 71(1): 55 (2002). Also Soft 
Drinks: Panel Report, Mexico–Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005).  
52
 ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadì and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council & 
Commission, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, Judgment of 3 September 2008. 
53
 CFI Kadi Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission, 21 September 2005, [2005] ECR II-3649.  
54
 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) 
55
 G. de Búrca, “The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi”, Harvard International Law 
Journal, 51, 1, 2010, 1-49. 
56
 Id., “The Road Not Taken: The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor”, in American Journal of International Law, 105, 
2011, 649 ff.  
57
 The Kadi decision however can also be stretched to represent a pattern of conditional agreement, based on mutual respect 
under conditions, which mirrors the equal protection requirement, or the Italian doctrine of ‘counter-limits’, and similarly 
the “So-lange” reasoning from the German constitutional court. I took this line in my “The Rule of Law beyond the State: 
Failures, Promises, and Theory”, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 7, Number 3, 442 – 467.  
58
 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 27021/08, 7 July 2011 (Al 
Jedda).  
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requested by art. 103 of the UN Charter
59
. That argument of conformity held by Lord Bingham 
amounts to a matter of hierarchy of rules in the international order
60
; it does not contest the existence 
of HR law, but its import within the system of IL.  
As an answer, the ECtHR walks a peculiar path: contrary to the ECJ in Kadi, it takes larger view 
than the scope of its own European Convention’s regime, and even larger than the task of individual, 
human rights’ protection. It takes into consideration the two orders’ interplay and minds of the 
integrity of the frame of IL where the Convention’s regime and the Security Council might sensibly 
concur, given general IL principles and those of the UN Charter, that is, the supranational and 
contextual legal setting (in which the Security Council is included). The argument does not touch the 
last word authority under art. 103 of the Charter, but first refuses to agree that the unlawful detention, 
without judicial review and lacking necessity, was commanded or authorized by the SC resolution. 
The normative context includes art 1 of the UN Charter entrenching ‘respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’ and article 24(2) requiring the SC to ‘act in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations’ ”61. Within those premises, not even the imperative of peace and 
security can be held as unconditional.  
According to the Court, since there must be “a presumption that the Security Council does not 
intend to impose any obligation on Member States to breach fundamental principles of human 
rights”62, the interpretation must be chosen that “is most in harmony with the requirements of the 
Convention and which avoids any conflict of obligations”63. Finally the Court concedes that it may 
still be possible that the SC would need to impose a rupture in the fabric of UN law, but then this 
should result only from “clear and explicit language” (§ 102) against international human rights law. 
As I have submitted elsewhere
64
, such an argument hardly means that the Court is ready to forfeit its 
content based logic, and surrender to hierarchy; it hardly means that a ‘clear and explicit language’ 
would turn legitimate by source what is not (the violation of HR Convention, outside state of 
necessity) in the integrity frame that the Court itself has aptly drawn. In this picture, the Court has 
built on a notion of legality that is complex enough to ask that whatever ‘clear and explicit language’, 
a proposition of law be ‘true’ under an interpretation of the grounds of law that grants equal weight to 
HR in the pursuit of the fundamental objectives of the UN.  
It is a subsequent decision, namely, Al Dulimi, to confirm that this interpretation of the import of Al 
Jedda is correct. The question would be, in fact, what should happen in case of ‘clear and explicit 
language’ against HR law? The Court has answered that question, overcoming the kind of acoustic 
                                                     
59
 See the para 35 (Lord Bingham) of the House of Lords decision, as pasted in the ECtHR, Al Jedda, at 11 : “Emphasis has 
often been laid on the special character of the European Convention as a human rights instrument. But the reference in 
article 103 [UN] to ‘any other international agreement’ leaves no room for any excepted category, and such appears to be 
the consensus of learned opinion”. The same author, Tom Bingham, though, has written the important book, The Rule of 
Law, London, Penguin, 2011. Clearly, his idea of the Rule of law is different from mine: cf. G. Palombella, “The 
Measure of Law. Domestic to International Law (and from Hamdan to Al Jedda)”, in J. Silkenat, J. Hickey, P. 
Barenboim, The Legal Doctrines of the Rule of Law and the Legal State (Rechtsstaat), Springer International Publishing, 
Dordrecht, 2014 
60
 That kind of appeal to the RoL in the international legal order, resonates in the 2005 decision of the European Court of 
First Instance in the case Kadi , supra fn. 53. 
61
 ECtHR, Al Jedda, supra n. 58, para 102 (and the premised para 44). 
62
 Ibidem. 
63
 Ibidem. 
64
 Cf. my The Measure of Law, supra fn 59. 
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separation between the involved legalities sharing a common terrain, upon which to settle a potential 
disagreement.  
The ECtHR
65
 deals with a UNSC 1483 (2003) resolution, which in “clear and explicit language” 
imposes to Switzerland, allowing to the State no discretion
66
, the freezing of the assets of Al Dulimi, 
one of those blacklisted as suspected terrorist, who had been denied any rights to defence. Since 
Switzerland
67
 had rejected Al Dulimi’s complaints and resolved to confiscate his assets, the Court 
decides that violation of art. 6 ECHR (access to justice) has taken place on behalf of the State, and that 
consequent responsibility falls on it as a member to the Convention, regardless of the duty to 
implement sanctions from the SC, and even in absence of any State’s discretionary power. In the 
reasoning of the Court, judicial review was not granted either at the UN or in the domestic procedure. 
Denial of access to justice, even in pursuing the legitimate ends of peace and security, is deemed 
disproportionate to achieve those objectives.  
It is important that the Court, in the same vein as in Al Jedda, does not take a merely external 
attitude toward the normative corpus of the UN, assuming instead that it should be taken into 
consideration qua normative in its scope, meaning and aims. Accordingly its reasoning is not shielded 
in a self-referential closure, but pursues a comprehensive assessment. This is why it believes that 
apparently conflicting obligations from the UN Charter and the ECHR must be at their best 
harmonized and reconciled (Art. 31(3) lit. c) VCLT (para 112). The presumption according to which 
SC does not in principle mean to impose obligations contradicting international laws of human rights 
(formulated in its Al Jedda decision), is defeated. But it follows that, however commanded by the 
highest source in UN security purposes, not every behaviour can be deemed legitimate, just for that. 
The Court engages in a proportionality judgment, that is, a contextual evaluation between two 
divergent rules-principles, one that might exceed the strict limits of its own jurisdiction (such a 
judgment implies a revision of the legality of the Security Council resolution, that other Courts in the 
EU case had considered themselves not competent to pursue).  
But such an assessment can only flow from taking the participant’s point of view68 in the 
interconnection of diverse international law regimes, prompted by the case under scrutiny. It requires 
bridging the gap that separates the two orders, that is, a deeper self understanding of one regime’s role 
as an agent of international law as a whole, and a further insight into the purposes and meaning 
concerning the ‘grounds’ of those laws, the mutual relation between institutions, and the founding 
ideals of the diverse orders in their integrity. No place the Court merely resorts to ‘formal’ tools. 
It has been from such an approach that the Court has chosen (right or wrong) to hold the State 
‘responsible’, putting the State “caught between the obligation to carry out Security Council decisions 
under Art. 25 of the UN Charter and the obligation to respect international or regional human rights 
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 ECHR chamber judgment of 26 November 2013 in Al-Dulimi, No. 5809/08. 
66
 The Court had already decided the case Nada where discretion was deemed existent (ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Nada v. 
Switzerland, No. 10593/08, judgment of 12 Sept. 2012). 
67
 The Swiss Federal Tribunal ((BGE 2A.783/784/ 785 /2006; all of 23 January 2008) had maintained that it was not 
entitled to revise the legality of SC resolutions except in the event (that was not) of violation of a jus cogens rule (as in 
the reasoning of the Court of First Instance of the EU in Kadi). After allowing Al Dulimi more time for a (unsuccessful) 
further appeal to that Committee, the Tribunal concluded that Switzerland’s behavior was legitimate, and did not violate 
either domestic constitutional norms or Artt. 6 and 13 of the ECHR. 
68
 Recall the opening of Dworkin’s Law’s Empire, (being the role of ‘participant’ a premise to interpretive endeavour) 
supra fn 26 
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guarantees”.69 It is however preeminent point here that its reasoning implies a value choice, one that 
would be itself arbitrary, according to a positivist construction of the international system under a UN 
supremacy clause; this value choice opposes the assumption that absolute supremacy of Security 
Council would always fulfil its substantive raison d’etre. The interplay between security and rights, 
viewed under a proportionality judgment, can basically depend on a further principle underlying the 
purpose of the international system. One could even submit that the argument here could easily 
conform to a general principle of power mitigation: in the sense that it both justifies the role of the 
Security Council vis à vis States arbitrary power and at the same time limits the Council itself in 
pursuing its tasks. 
6. As a conclusion  
The cases recalled above from Kadi to Al Jedda and Al Dulimi should also be taken to show that in the 
relations between separate regimes of law, and in the relations between State legal orders and 
international law, the ‘plain fact view’ and the only reference to the historical, social facts of rules-
production by pre defined sources, leave inevitably, outside the State, a very ample room for 
disagreement: one that does not in fact concern the existence of documents, institutions and orders, but 
the import and meaning that should be ascribed to them either in isolation or in the mutual relations 
among legalities. Genuine disagreement originates here despite the very fact that no contestation arises 
as regards the sources of the relevant rules (say, art 103 of the Un Charter, or any of the SC 
Resolutions). This not ‘empirical’ disagreement exceeds the range of control conceived through 
‘normal’ legal positivism. Disagreements that Dworkin saw ‘theoretical’ are essentially involving 
different interpretations- understanding of the fundamental principles, in the political-moral sense, that 
institutions of law are meant to be premised on.  
The key vault in the relations among mutually external (or self-contained) legalities, is the 
recognition of their being both relevant and thus equally internal to the case at stake. In such a context, 
different interpretations of respective grounds of law need to be further elaborated in the interplay 
among legalities (that actually escape a clear hierarchical systematization) endowed, in the global 
space, with distinctive rules of recognition. Given the angle of the case, the Court’s reasoning might 
on one side be viewed as interpreting the rules and principles of each involved legal regimes, and on 
the other side arbitrating their interplay on a proportionality assessment. One possible argument to 
justify this latter move, that is, a kind of ‘jurisdiction overstepping’, requires appeal to further 
principle premised to supranational law, beyond States. A plausible candidate might be the 
Dworkinian principle of mitigation of States’ power and of international organisations, one that 
justifies both positive and negative duties. It turns to the political morality of social communities under 
States purview. It substantively refers to the essential concern and respect for the dignity of citizens, 
asking that the exercise of power, from whichever actors, can only be legitimate under the limitations 
that such respect imposes to each concurring regime of law on a case by case basis. From the 
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 So writes Anne Peters, “Targeted Sanctions after Affaire Al-Dulimi et Montana Management Inc. c. Suisse: Is There a 
Way Out of the Catch-22 for UN Members?,” in EJIL Talk, http://www.ejiltalk.org/author/anne-peters/ See the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Sajo: the complaint should have been dismissed, as “irrecevable” (inadmissible) ratione personae, 
because the State is not acting of its own but clearly under the order of the SC, which gave it no leeway. But he did join 
the majority in deciding that a violation of HR occurred due to the insufficient guarantees provided by the UN sanctions 
system. Read it in coda to Al Dulimi decision of the Court, supra fn 65. 
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foregoing, the role and potential of ‘principles’ in the different guises and levels analysed in this 
article, can all the more be seen at the forefront of IL adjudication. 
 
 
  
Gianluigi Palombella 
16 
Author contacts: 
 
Gianluigi Palombella 
Professor of Legal Theory 
Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza  
Via dell’Università 12 
43100 Parma 
and 
Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, 
P.za Martiri della Libertà, 33 
56100 Pisa 
Email: g.palombella@sssup.it 
 
Distinguished Fellow, Global Governance Programme, RSCAS, EUI (2013-14) 
Email: Gianluigi.Palombella@eui.eu  
 
